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Purchaser's Depreciation Rights in Property Subject to a
Lease
INTRODUCTION

A taxpayer who purchases 1 from an original lessor land that is
subject to a lease may pay more for the property than what its fair
market value would be without the lease. The property may also
feature improvements added by the lessor or the lessee under the
terms of the lease. 2 Because the annual rental income from the property is, for tax purposes, ordinary income to the purchaser,3 the purchaser will want to reduce the resulting tax burden through
depreciation deductions.4
However, the purchaser's depreciation rights are unclear. Although most courts have denied the purchaser any right to depreciate lessee-constructed buildings during the lease term,S at least one
court6 has reached a contrary result. Further, one court7 and several
l. The Internal Revenue Code (Code) provides that for purposes of I.R.C. § 1011 (1982)
(adjusted basis for determining gain or loss), a taxpayer acquiring property by purchase receives a basis in the property based on cost. See I.R.C. § 1012 (1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.1012l(a) (1960). A taxpayer acquiring property from a decedent generally receives a basis for
§ 1011 purposes equal to the fair market value of the property at the date of the decedent's
death. See I.R.C. § 1014(a) (1982).
Depreciation deductions are computed with respect to this§ 1011 basis, apparently without
regard to how the taxpayer acquired that basis, see I.R.C. §§ 167(g); 168(d)(l)(A)(i) (1982).
However, at least one court has suggested that the method by which the property was acquired
- by purchase or from a decedent - might affect depreciation. See Friend v. Commissioner,
119 F.2d 959,961 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 673 (1941);see also Quilliam, Depreciation of Property Acquired Subject lo a Lease: Premium Lease Rentals as a Wasting Asset, 4
VAL. U.L. REv. 261, 265-267 (1970). Nevertheless, courts and commentators have generally
rejected this view. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Moore, 207 F.2d 265,275 (9th Cir. 1953) (treat
heir "as if he were a purchaser"), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 942 (1954); Rubin, Depreciation of
Property Purchased Subject lo a Lease, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1134, 1137 (1952); Quilliam,supra, at
267. This Note assumes that there is no differential treatment of taxpayers who acquire prop•
erty by inheritance rather than purchase and therefore cites cases where property was so ac•
quired as relevant precedent for issues discussed in the context of a purchase. Further, the
conclusions that this Note reaches apply to those who inherit property as well as those who
purchase it.
2. See notes 43-45 & 48 infra and accompanying text.
3. See I.R.C. § 6l(a)(5) (1982).
4. See I.R.C. § 62(5) (1982) (adjusted gross income); I.R.C. § 167 (1982) (depreciation),
5. See, e.g., Geneva Drive In Theatre, Inc. v. Commissioner, 622 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1980);
see also note 68 infta and accompanying text.
6. World Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 614 (8th Cir. 1962). The taxpayer
purchased for $700,000 the lessor's entire interest in property subject to a lease. Pursuant to
the terms of the lease, the lessee had constructed a building on the property; its useful life was
not expected to extend beyond the term of the lease. 299 F.2d at 616. The circuit court noted
that evidence placed the value of the land alone at $400,000. 299 F.2d at 617. The court
upheld an allocation of $300,000 of the purchase price to the building and allowed the purchaser to depreciate the building during the lease term.
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commentators8 have suggested that the lease itself may be a depreciable asset. Nevertheless, rio authority has fully analyzed whether
and to what extent depreciable interests have been acquired by the
purchaser.
This Note argues that the purchase of property subject to a lease
may produce several types of depreciable interests.9 Part I of the
Note examines the requirements for depreciability and the role that
depreciation plays in tax law. It concludes tliat even where the
method set out by Congress also accommodates other goals, depreciation primarily provides a way to recover costs during a depreciable
asset's income-producing life. Part II applies these principles to the
task of determining whether improvements - for example, buildings on the property subject to the lease - are depreciable in the
purchaser's hands. It concludes that while the purchaser's investment in an improvement m3:de by the lessor is currently depreciable,
depreciation of any investment in an improvement added by the
lessee must await the termination of the lease. Part III examines the
extent to which the lease itself may be depreciabie as a separate asset
during the lease term. It concludes that the lease is of consequence
for tax purposes only if it secures for a given asset rents that are more
valuable than those available in the market. Firlally, Part IV argues
that the difficulty inherent in valuating potentially depreciable interests is an insufficient reason for denying their depreciability.
I.

DEPRECIATION THEORY

When a taxpayer incurs k. cost in the course of generating taxable
income, tax law generally acknowledges that cost by allowing the
taxpayer to offset it in some manner against the income generated. Io
For example, a businessman may deduct operating expenditures
made to produce current business income. I I Similarly, if an investment will generate income over a finite period of time, the taxpayer
7. Commissioner v. Moore, 207 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 942 (1954),
on remand, 24 T.C.M (P-H) ~ 55,219 (1955).
8. Quilliam, mpra note l; Rubin, supra note l; Comment, Taxation - .Depreciation of Ten•
ant Erected Improvements by Purchaser-Lessor, 1963 Wis. L. REV. 484.
9. Unless otherwise indicated, the ~erms "depreciation" and "depreciability" as used in this
Note apply to depreciation of both tangible and intangible assets uhder I.R.C. §167 (1982), and
include accelerated cost recovery for tangible assets under I.R.C. § 168 (1982). Cf. Kahn,Accelerated .Depreciation - Tax Expenditure or Proper Allowance for Meamring Income?, 78
MICH. L. REV. 1, 14 n.51 (1979) (confusion arises because "[d)epreciation is a type of amortization, and the terms are sometimes used interchangeably").
10. See generally Kahn, mpra note 9, at 13-14.
I 1. See I.R.C. §§ 162, 212 (1982); see also I.R.C. §§ 1001, 1011, 1012 & 1016 (1982) (seller
of asset may offset the adjusted cost of that asset against the proceeds); I.R.C. § 6l(a)(2) (1982)
(gross income includes "gross income derived from business"); Treas. Reg. § l.61-3(a), T.D.
7285, 1973-2 C.B. 163 (for seller of goods, gross income is total sales less the cost of the inventory sold).
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can depreciate the cost of the investment over its life. 12
Depreciation under section 167 of the Internal Revenue Code is
thus a means of allocating the cost of capital assets whose lives are
finite. The full cost of purchasing those assets, which are generally
expected to be useful substantially beyond the taxable year, is not
currently deductible. 13 Rather, the cost is capitalized and may be
deducted only over those tax years in which the asset contributes to
the production of income. 14 This allocation matches income from
particular periods with the costs required to produce it, which, in this
context, are ratable portions of capital expenditures. 15 The Supreme
Court aptly described the concept of depreciation:
Over a period of time a capital asset is consumed and, correspondingly
over that period, its theoretical value and utility are thereby reduced.
Depreciation is an accounting device which recognizes that the physical consumption of a capital asset is a true cost, since the asset is being
depleted. As the process of consumption continues, and depreciation is
claimed and allowed, the asset's adjusted income tax basis is reduced
to reflect the distribution of its cost over the accounting periods
affected. 16

To be depreciable, an asset must meet three requirements, all of
which derive from the role of depreciation as a means of cost allocation. First, the taxpayer must have a capital investment in the asset.17 The investment constitutes the asset's cost. 18 Thus, title to an
asset does not by itself ensure the existence of a depreciable
12. See I.R.C. § 167 (1982); M. CHJRELSTEJN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION~ 6.07 at 12930 (3d ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as M. CHJRELSTEIN].
13. See I.R.C.§ 263(a)(l982); Treas. Reg.§ l.263(a)-l(a-b) (1960); M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra
note 12, ~ 6.02 at 104; Kahn, supra note 9, at 13.
14. See Treas. Reg. § l.167(a)-l (1960); l B. BITTKER, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ~ 23.1.4 (1981) [hereinafter cited as B. BITTKER]; M. CHIREL·
STEIN, supra note 12, ~ 6.07; Kahn, supra note 9, at 13-14. In some cases, however, the full cost
of the asset may not be allocated through depreciation. Where salvage value limits apply, the
asset may not be depreciated below its salvage value. See notes 22 & 32-33 i'!fra and accompanying text.
15. See Co=issioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1974) (" '[T)he purpose of
depreciation accounting is to allocate the expense of using an asset to the various periods
which are benefitted by that asset.'") (quoting Hertz Corp. v. United States, 364 U.S. 122, 126
(1960)); l B. BITTKER, supra note 14, ~ 23.l.l at 23-26; M. CiitRELSTEIN, supra note 12, ~
6.07(a); Kahn, supra note 9, at 13-14.
16. Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. I, 10 (1974) (footnote omitted).
17. See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 581 (1978) ("(T]he facts focus on
[the taxpayer] as the one whose capital was committed to the building and as the party, therefore, that was entitled to claim depreciation for the consumption of that capital."); Helvering v.
Lazarus, 308 U.S. 252, 254 (1939); see also Schubert v. Co=issioner, 286 F.2d 573, 579 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 960 (1961); Goelet v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 305, 307
(S.D.N.Y. 1958), affd, 266 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1959).
18. See, e.g., Gladding Dry Goods Co. v. Commissioner, 2 B.T.A. 336, 338 (1925) ("The
important question is . . . who made the investment of the capital which is to be recovered
(through depreciation] . . . .")
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investment. 19
Second, in order to be depreciable, an asset must be "wasting." 20
Wasting assets are those that will generate a finite income stream. 21
They are wasting in the sense that their income-producing potential
and, therefore, the taxpayer's investment are gradually exhausted
over time. For depreciation purposes, an investment in an asset is
wasting to the extent of the difference between the asset's initial
value and its "salvage" value, as determined at the time of investment.22 Since that much of the investment is not recoverable, it is a
19. See, e.g., M. DeMatteo Constr. Co. v. United States, 433 F.2d 1263, 1265 (1st Cir. 1970)
(purchaser acquired only "bare legal title" which was not an "interest of any substance");
Gladding Dry Goods Co. v. Commissioner, 2 B.T.A. 336, 338 (1925) (" 'Depreciation' is . . .
not predicated upon ownership of the property . . . .").
20. See, e.g., Griswold v. Commissioner, 400 F.2d 427,433 (5th Cir. 1968) ("The property,
to be depreciable, must be an inherently wasting asset, but this allowance is not limited to
tangible assets."); Commissioner v. Moore, 207 F.2d 265,268 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 942 (1954) ("[Depreciation) is available to him whose interest in the wasting asset is such
that he would suffer an economic loss resulting from the deterioration and physical exhaustion
as it takes place."); I B. BITTKER, supra note 14, ~ 23.2.4.
21. Physically wasting tangible assets are those that cannot generate income indefinitely.
See M. CHIRELSTEIN,supra note 12, ~ 6.07(a), at 130 ("Property is depreciable . . . if its useful
life is definite and predictable, as it would be in the case of buildings and machines which wear
out over a determinable period of time . . . ."). As to intangible property, the regulations
state:
If an intangible asset is known from experience or other factors to be of use in the
business or in the production of income for only a limited period, the length of which can
be estimated with reasonable accuracy, such an intangible asset may be the subject of a
depreciation allowance.
Treas. Reg. § l.167(a)-3 (1956). See also M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 12, ~ 2.0l(a), at 28
("[T]angible assets such as buildings and equipment, and even certain intangibles . . . , have
limited useful lives and lose their value as productive instruments over a period of time
...."); cf. Kahn, supra note 9, at 35 n.108 & 36 (common stock is a "nonwasting asset" and
an "income-producing asset[ ) that [has] no ascertainable useful life").
22. See notes 32-33 infra and accompanying text. An asset's "salvage value" acts as a limit
on the depreciable amount of the taxpayer's investment. "Salvage value is the amount (determined at the time of acquisition) which is estimated will be realizable upon sale or other
disposition of an asset when it is no longer useful . . . and is to be retired from service by the
taxpayer." Treas. Reg.§ 1.167(a)-l(c)(I), T.D. 6712, 1964-1 (Pt. I) C.B. 106, 108. Further:
The [depreciation) allowance is that amount which should be set aside for the taxable year
. . . , so that the aggregate of the amounts set aside, plus the salvage value, will, at the end
of the estimated useful life of the depreciable property, equal the cost or other basis of the
property . . . . An asset shall not be depreciated below a reasonable salvage value under
any method of computing depreciation.
Treas. Reg.§ l.167(a)-l(a), T.D. 6712, 1964-1 (Pt. I) C.B. 106, 108. Estimated salvage value is
not discounted to present value. See Kahn, supra note 9, at 40-41.
Salvage value is less significant in practice since Congress passed the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981. For all assets depreciable under the Accelerated Cost Recovery System
(ACRS), salvage value does not limit the depreciation deduction. See I.R.C. § 168(f)(9)
(1982). ACRS generally applies to tangible property placed in service after 1980. I.R.C.
§ !68(e)(l) (1982). Although ACRS allows the taxpayer to ignore salvage value in certain
instances, Congress did not intend to eliminate depreciation's cost recovery role. Rather,
ACRS merely relaxes strict cost allocation concepts in order to stimulate investment and simplify depreciation rules. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, at 75 (Comm. Print 1981)
[hereinafter cited as COMMITTEE EXPLANATION), reprinted in 1980-1981 INTERNAL REVENUE
ACTS, at 1369, 1449 (1982) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY) (salvage value determi-
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cost that must be allocated through depreciation. Accordingly, the
portion of the investment that is expected to be recoverable is not
depreciable. Similarly, no depreciation is allowable when an asset is
thought not to be wasting at all, as is the case with unimproved
land.23
The third requirement for depreciability is that the taxpayer must
employ the asset in an income-producing capacity.24 That is, the asset must be either "used in the trade or business" or "held for the
production of income."25 This requirement follows from depreciation's cost allocation role and from two additional tax principles.
First, the Code does not tax imputed personal income such as the
benefit of living in a home or using an appliance. 26 Second, the Code
does not generally allow deductions for personal expenditures,
which ultimately generate imputed income. 27 A taxpayer may therefore allocate the cost of a wasting asset through depreciation only
when the asset is involved in producing taxable income.28
Consistent with these three requirements, a taxpayer attempting
to claim a depreciation deduction must establish for each asset
"three basic elements that affect the computation of depreciation." 29
The first of these is the taxpayer's "basis" in the wasting asset. Basis
nations "are inherently uncertain" and "too frequently resulted in unproductive disagree•
ments").
For tangible assets that do not qualify for ACRS and intangible assets, salvage value continues to impose a significant limit on depreciation.
23. As to the nondepreciability of land, see Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United
States, 481 F.2d 1240, 1258 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1129 (1974); Bender v. United
States, 383 F.2d 656, 659 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 958 (1968); Treas. Reg.
§ l.167(a)-2 (1956). See generally l B. BITIKER,supra note 14, ~ 23.2.5; 4 J. MERTENS, LAW OF
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION§ 23.50 (rev. vol. 1980).
Where no depreciation is allowable, the taxpayer generally recovers his investment for tax
purposes when he disposes of the asset. See I.R.C. §§ 1001, 1011, 1012 & 1016 (1982); M.
CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 12, ~~ 2.0l(a), 6.02, at 104. Commentators have noted that although
other methods of cost recovery for nonwasting assets would be defensible, they have not been
accepted in tax law. See, e.g., id. ~ 2.0l(a); Kahn, supra note 9, at 41-42.
24. See, e.g., Schubert v. Commissioner, 286 F.2d 573, 579 (4th Cir.) cert. denied 366 U.S.
960 (1961); 1 B. BITTKER,supra note 14, ~ 23.1.1, at 23-5; Kahn,supra note 9, at 14 ("depreciation is the amortization of the cost of an asset over the period that the owner employs it in a
profit-seeking activity") (footnotes omitted).
25. I.R.C. § 167(a) (1982).
26. M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 12, ~ 1.03.
27. I.R.C. § 262 (1982); M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 12, ~ 1.03, at 24; id. at 88.
28. As long as the asset is involved in the production of income, a depreciation deduction
may be taken even in a year or years in which the particular asset does not actually produce
any income. "(I]t is not necessary . . . that income actually accrue to the taxpayer from the
property in question during the taxable year or years under scrutiny. What matters is the
taxpayer's purpose to obtain income from it as the motive for his holding of it." First Natl.
Bank v. Nee, 190 F.2d 61, 66 (Bili Cir. 1951); see also Kahn, supra note 9, at 14 ("The present
depreciation laws allow a cost recovery by allocating a deduction to each year of useful life,
whether or not the amount so allocated exceeds the amount earned from the asset in that
year.").
29. Kahn, supra note 9, at 15.
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reflects the taxpayer's investment in the asset, all or a portion of
which will be allocated by depreciation as a cost in a given year. 30
Second, the amount of time during which the asset will generate income for the taxpayer is its "useful life." 31 Finally, the asset's "salvage value" is the estimated amount, if any, of the basis that the
taxpayer will realize upon the asset's disposition at the end of its
useful life.32 Salvage value is that portion of the investment in the
asset that is not wasting. 33 Depreciation, then, allocates over the asset's useful life the amount of the basis in excess of the salvage value.
Although the methods of depreciation available to a taxpayer are
limited,34 those that are allowed are not generally meant to reflect an
ideal cost allocation scheme.35 First, there is no consensus as to what
a perfect scheme would be in a given depreciation context. 36 Second, income streams and useful lives of assets are unpredictable. 37
Therefore, Congress has chosen in some cases to set out a particular
depreciation method in order to stimulate investment in certain
types of assets. 38 In other cases, Congress has restricted methods pri30. Id. at 15. Whether the taxpayer acquired the basis by purchasing the asset or by acquiring the asset from a decedent is irrelevant, see note I supra.
31. See Treas. Reg.§ l.l67(a)-l(b) (1956); Kahn, supra note 9, at 15-16. Where ACRS
applies, the estimate of an asset's useful life is less significant. ACRS employs "predetermined
recovery periods that are generally umelated to, but shorter than, prior law useful lives." CoMMlTIEE EXPLANATION, supra note 22, at 75-76, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
22, at 1449-50. As to ACRS's deemphasis of salvage value, see note 22 supra.
32. See note 22 supra; see also Kahn, supra note 9, at 16.
33. One cannot generally point to an asset and identify the portion that is not w~ting. An
asset's physical nature or limited life means that it is wasting, see note 21 supra, and such
characteristics apply to the asset as a whole. But depreciation is concerned with recovery of an
asset's cost. If a portion of that cost may be recovered on disposition, then it is not "wasting"
over the life of the asset.
34. For example, ACRS and other forms of accelerated depreciation are not available for
intangible property. See I.R.C. §§ 167(c), 168(c)(l) (1982); Treas. Reg. § l.l67(c)-l(a)(l)
(1956); KIRO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 155, 168 (1968). Thus, intangibles may be depreciated only by using straight line depreciation. See I.R.C. § 167(b)(l),(c) (1982). Further,
where ACRS does not apply to a tangible asset, the Code prescribes a maximum rate of depreciation. See I.R.C. § 167 (b),(c) & G) (1982). If ACRS applies to a given asset, only two
depreciation methods are available. See I.R.C. § 168(b) (1982).
35. See, e.g., Fribourg Navigation Co. v. Commissioner, 383 U.S. 272, 277 (1966) ("[T]ax
law has long recognized the accounting concept that depreciation is a process of estimated
allocation . . . . "); Weiss v. Weiner, 279 U.S. 333, 335 (1929) (''The income tax laws do not
profess to embody perfect economic theory."); l B. BITIKER, supra note 14, ~ 23.l.l, at 23-5;
M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 12, ~ 6.07(d).
36. Compare M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 12, ~ 6.07(d) (suggesting that proper depreciation should reflect loss in an asset's value), with Kahn, supra note 9, at 30-39 (arguing that
depreciation should reflect the cost in present value terms of annual income flows from an
asset).
37. See, e.g., Kahn, supra note 9, at 34.
38. The expanded availability of accelerated depreciation for new tangible property in
1954 is one example of this congressional motive. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
25-26 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 4621, 4656 (''The incentives
resulting from the changes are well timed to help maintain the present high level of investment
in plant and equipment."). More recently, Congress passed ACRS in order to stimulate invest-
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marily to exclude those that the taxpayer might otherwise have
employed.39
Finally, where a taxpayer has a depreciable interest in an asset,
the asset must be characterized for tax purposes in order to determine the methods of depreciation available. In theory, a wasting
asset merely represents a finite stream of income.40 But tax law distinguishes between tangible and intangible assets41 by allowing accelerated depreciation only as to the former. 42 Thus, a necessary
step is to identify whether a taxpayer has acquired tangible or intangible wasting assets, if any.
II.

DEPRECIABILITY OF IMPROVEMENTS ON LEASED PROPERTY

When a purchaser acquires land subject to a long-term lease
from the original lessor, the land often features an improvement
such as a building43 that has been provided and maintained44 either
by the lessee or the lessor pursuant to the terms of the lease.45 The
ment and improve administration. COMMITTEE EXPLANATION, supra note 22, at 75, reprinted
in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,supra note 22, at 1449. The Code's treatment of research and experimental expenditures provides another example. See I.R.C. § 174 (1982); S. REP. No. 1622,
supra, at 33-34, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS, at 4663-64 (§ 174 sets out
methods "to encourage taxpayers to carry on research and experimentation"). See also I.R.C.
§ 169 (1982) (amortization of pollution control facilities); I.R.C. § 179 (1982) (election to expense certain depreciable assets in the year of acquisition); I B. BIITKER, supra note 14, ~
23.1.1, at 23-6, 7; M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 12, ~ 6.07(d).
39. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 167(b)(l),(c) (1982) (restricts depreciation of intangibles to straight
line); I.R.C. § 167(b)(4) (1982) (restricts available depreciation methods to those that will not
exceed allowances under the double declining balance method); I.R.C. § 177 (1982) (trademark and trade name expenditure amortization); I.R.C. §§ 195, 248 (1982) (amortization of
start up and organizational expenditures).
40. See note 21 supra and accompanying text; see also V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 41-43 (2d ed. 1979) (discussion of budgeting
decisions based on discounting of expected returns); M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 12, ~ 6.02, at
103 ("[T]he cost of. . . properties represents a present payment by the taxpayer for economic
benefits that will accrue to him in the future . . . ."); id. ~ 6.07(d) (analysis of the effect of
available depreciation methods on investment decisions); Kahn, supra note 9, at 32-33 (noting
that Professor Chirelstein's analysis of depreciation "begins with an assumption that the market value of an asset is the present value of the income stream that the asset will produce").
41. As to differential treatment of intangible property, see generally Treas. Reg.§§ l.167(a)2, l.167(a)-3 (1956); I B. BITTKER, supra note 14, ~ 23.2.6; Schenk, Depreciation of Intangible
Assets: The Uncertainty of Death and Taxes, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 501 (1967).
42. See note 34 supra.
43. The property can feature any type of improvement. However, this Note will use the
term "building" because a building is the most common example of an improvement on the
acquired property.
44. This Note assumes that the lease sets out which party must maintain a building on the
land. As "maintain" is used in this Note, the party that has the duty must assure the existence
of the building in a condition suitable for the lessee's use as contemplated by the lease. Thus,
where the lessor has the duty to maintain, he is responsible for general repairs and, most
importantly, replacement of the building when necessary during the term of the lease.
45. 4 J. MERTENS, supra note 23, § 23.90. Where the lessee constructs the building pursuant to the lease, title to the building may pass to the lessor immediately or upon termination of
the lease. Under I.R.C. § 109 (1982), the value of improvements passing to the lessor on termi-
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purchaser seeking expedited cost recovery through depreciation
would look first to the depreciability of the building. This approach
is sensible because depreciation of a tangible asset like a building
can be accelerated, while depreciation of intangibles cannot.46 Moreover, as a physically wasting and highly visible asset, a building is
the most likely candidate for depreciability. This Part discusses
whether or not a building is a depreciable asset for the purchaser
and, if it is depreciable, when and how the purchaser may depreciate
it. 47 It concludes that a purchaser acquires a tangible wasting asset
depreciable during the lease term only if the lessor constructs or
maintains the building pursuant to the terms of the lease.
A.

Original depreciation rights

By designating the party who will invest in tangible improvements,48 the lease establishes the allocation of depreciation rights between the lessor and the lessee. For example, a lessor whose capital is
invested in the construction of a building on the leased property will
demand rents from the lessee in order to compensate for that investment.49 Thus, the building will be an income-producing asset for the
nation of the lease is not included in the lessor's gross income unless the improvements constitute "rent."
Where the lessor must provide and maintain the building, the lessor may have constructed
the building prior to the lease, in which case he merely maintains the building under the lease,
or pursuant to the terms of the lease.
46. See notes 41-42 supra and accompanying text.
47. For other co=entary discussing depreciable interests of a taxpayer who purchases
from a lessor, see Quilliam, supra note I; Rubin, supra note I; Co=ent, supra note 8.
48. The parties will consider depreciation and other tax implications as factors in determining which party will invest in improvements. As the Supreme Court observed in Frank
Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978), "We cannot ignore the reality that the tax laws
affect the shape of nearly every business transaction." 435 U.S. at 580 (citing Co=issioner v.
Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 579-80 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring)). In Lyon, the Service argued that
the taxpayer did not own the building at issue and, therefore, that he could neither depreciate
the building as rental property nor mortgage it in order to deduct the related interest payments
for tax purposes. The Court upheld Lyon's right to interest and depreciation deductions as the
owner of the building. The Court explained:
The fact that favorable tax consequences were taken into account by Lyon on entering
into the transaction is no reason for disallowing those consequences. . . .
. . . We . . . conclude that it is Lyon's capital that is invested in the building according to the agreement of the parties, and it is Lyon that is entitled to depreciation deductions . . . .
. . . [W]e hold that where, as here, there is a genuine multiple-party transaction with
economic substance which is compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory realities,
is imbued with tax-independent considerations, and is not shaped solely by tax-avoidance
features . . . , the Government should honor the allocation of rights and duties effectuated by the parties.
435 U.S. at 580-81, 583-84 (footnote omitted).
49. Lurie, Depreciating Structures Bought Under Long Leases: An Adventure in Blunder/and, 18 INST. ON FED. TAXN 43, 59 (1960); Quilliam, supra note I, at 284; Co=ent, supra
note 8, at 488. While it is clear that the lessor will receive rents to compensate him for providing the building, this Note makes two assumptions regarding those rents attributable to the
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lessor. The Code, in tum, allows the lessor to offset his construction
cost against that income by means of depreciation deductions. This
result follows because the lessor meets the three requirements for
depreciability.50 The lessor has an investment in the building pursuant to the lease, a building generally constitutes a wasting asset, 51
and the building is held for the production of income.
In contrast, where the lease requires the lessee to construct a
building, the lessee will pay rent only for the land.52 Thus, the land
is the lessor's only income producing asset under such a lease. Because in this situation the building is wasting only as to the lessee,
the lessee alone is entitled to the depreciation deduction. The
lessee's entitlement arises both because the lessee meets the three requirements for depreciability53 and because the Code and Regulations explicitly provide for depreciation by the lessee. 54 Moreover,
the lessee's entitlement is exclusive because the lessor obtains no income from the building and has no investment in it. The fact that
the lessor cannot meet two of the three requirements for
depreciability means that the lessor may not depreciate a lessee-constructed building. 55

B. .Depreciation Rights of Purchaser
1. .Depreciation Rights for a Building Constructed and Maintained
by the Lessor
The original distribution of income and depreciation rights between lessor and lessee should continue to govern the rights of one
who purchases from the lessor. The purchase will not affect the parties' rights and obligations under the lease, and tax treatment must
lessor-constructed building. First, it assumes that the lease sets out in some manner the amount
of rents attributable to the building. Second, it assumes that the lessor has the duty to maintain the building originally provided such that the lessor's receipt of the building rents, and the
lessee's obligation to pay them, is conditioned on the lessor's performance of that duty.
50. See notes 17-28 supra and accompanying text. Cf. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States,
435 U.S. 561, 581 (1978) ("[T]he facts focus upon Lyon as the one whose capital was committed to the building and as the party, therefore, that was entitled to claim depreciation for the
consumption of that capital.").
51. In contrast, where the lessee promises to repair physical exhaustion as it occurs, the
lessor will be denied depreciation because the wasting requirement will not be met. See, e.g.,
Commissioner v. Moore, 207 F.2d 265, 269 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 942 (1954);
c.f. note 49 supra (discussing this Note's assumption that lessor has the duty to maintain a
lessor-constructed building).
52. See Quilliam, supra note I, at 263; Comment, supra note 8, at 488; see also First Natl.
Bank v. Nee, 190 F.2d 61, 66 (8th Cir. 1951). This conclusion assumes that there is no lessorconstructed improvement.
53. The lessee has invested in a building, a wasting asset, for the purpose of producing
income. See notes 17-28 supra and accompanying text.
54. See I.R.C. § 178 (1982); Treas. Reg.§ 1.167(a)-4, T.D. 6520, 1961-1 C.B. 52.
55. See M. DeMatteo Constr. Co. v. United States, 433 F.2d 1263, 1264-65 (1st Cir. 1970);
4 J. MERTENS, supra note 23, § 23.90; see also notes 17-28 supra and accompanying text.
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continue to reflect the economic consequences of those rights and
obligations. Thus, where the lessor has invested in and must maintain the building, the purchaser should acquire a currently depreciable interest in the building. The building will presumably produce
the same rental income for the purchaser as it did for his predecessor.56 Because the building is producing income, the purchase price
of the property will reflect the increased rents attributable to the
building and will therefore give the purchaser a basis in the building. 57 Because the building has a finite life, 58 it is also an asset that is
wasting as to the purchaser. Taken together, these factors indicate
that the purchaser should be entitled to depreciate his basis in the
building.59
Moreover, the applicable depreciation rules should generally6° be
those that Congress has developed for tangible assets. 61 The building
is clearly a tangible asset. Further, the fact that the income that the
building generates is controlled by a pre-existing lease should not
alter the asset's tangible character, 62 except to the extent that the
56. Because the land and the building are subject to the lease, the lease continues to govern
the rentals attributable to each. See Rubin,supra note l, at 1143-44 ("The value of the lessor's
interest is determined primarily by the rights reserved to him by the lease and the right to
possession upon termination of the lease."); note 49 supra and accompanying text. As a result,
both assets are isolated from market forces that might otherwise affect their respective rental
values.
57. [W]here the prior owner erected the building, the rents accruing to him will normally
be greater than if the tenant had erected the building. The price for which the prior owner
sells his property will therefore reflect his investment in, and the rent return on, the building, and the purchaser consequently cannot be regarded as having merely paid for land.
Lurie, supra note 49, at 59; see also Comment, supra note 8, at 488.
The purchaser will value the building based on anticipated rental income. If the building's
life exceeds the lease term, the anticipated rents will be those secured by the lease plus the
expected rental value after the lease's termination. Where the building's life is shorter than the
lease term, the anticipated rents will be only those secured by the lease for the building's life.
After that, the purchaser must invest in a new building in order to obtain continued building
rents. See note 49 supra and accompanying text In either case, the building will not generate
income indefinitely.
58. See notes 20-23 supra and accompanying text. Cf. note 62 iefra and accompanying
text (focus is on building, not lease).
59. See notes 17-28 supra and accompanying text.
60. The lease may produce rentals attributable to the building that are more valuable than
the market rentals that could be obtained at the time of purchase. See notes 94-99 iefra and
accompanying text. Where the lease has "premium" value, a portion of the purchaser's investment in rentals attributable to the building constitutes an investment in the lease as a separate
asset, rather than the building. This portion is depreciable as an intangible asset. See notes
100-108 iefra and accompanying text.
61. For a discussion of the different depreciation treatment of tangible and intangible assets, see notes 40-42 supra and accompanying text.
62. See Lurie, supra note 49, at 46 (footnote omitted):
[O]ne could say that the fee owner who himself constructs a building, which he then puts
under a long-term lease, has lost his depreciable interest in the brick and steel; but we
know that is not the law. . . . The point is, however, that the existence of a long-term
lease does not rob the owner of his "brick interest" . . . .
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lease produces favorable rentals. 63 Because the lessor-constructed
building is a tangible asset, the purchaser should be permitted to depreciate his basis64 in the building by using the Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS).6s
2. .Depreciation Rights For a Building Constructed and Maintained
by the Lessee

In contrast, where the lessee has invested in a building, the purchaser of the lessor's interest should have no currently depreciable
interest. Because a lessee-constructed building would not generate
rental income for the lessor during the term of the lease, 66 the building would not produce during that time a rental value that could be
reflected in the purchase price for the entire property. 67 The purchaser would therefore have no basis in the building. As a result, the
purchaser generally is not entitled to depreciation deductions for the
improvement; he acquires no interest that meets the requirements for
depreciability.68
63. See note 60 supra.
64. Treas. Reg. § l.l67(a)-5 (1956) governs apportionment of basis between the land and
the building where there is an aggregate purchase price. The fair market values used should
take into account the fact that both the land and the building are subject to the lease, See
Commissioner v. Moore, 207 F.2d 265, 269 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 942 (1954);
notes 56-57 supra; see also Rev. Rul. 60-180, 1960-1 C.B. 114, 116 (allocation of price considered "fair market value of the land (subject to the sublease thereon)").
Where there is a premium value as to the building, a portion of the purchaser's investment
in building rentals constitutes an investment in the lease. See note 60 supra. Thus, the
purchase price must be allocated in part to the premium in order to establish the basis of the
premium.
65. I.R.C. § 168 (1982) governs ACRS. Among other limitations, ACRS applies only to
property placed in service by the taxpayer after 1980. I.R.C. § 168(e)(l) (1982), For a discussion of the rationales for and implications of ACRS, see notes 22, 31 & 38 supra.
66. See Schubert v. Commissioner, 286 F.2d 573, 580 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
960 (1961); Commissioner v. Moore, 207 F.2d 265, 271 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
942 (1954); First Natl. Bank v. Nee, 190 F.2d 61, 66-67 (8th Cir. 1951); Geneva Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 764, 769 (1977), ajfd, 622 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1980); Rowan
v. Commmissioner, 22 T.C. 865, 874 (1954). The lessee is clearly not paying rental for the
building when the full lease rental must be paid regardless of whether the building continues
to exist.
61. See M. DeMatteo Constr. Co. v. United States, 433 F.2d 1263, 1265 (Isl Cir. 1970);
Commissioner v. Moore, 207 F.2d 265, 270 (9th Cir. 1953) ("If those who [valued the property]
... considered that the ... interest was one in a building subject lo a lease, they may have
attached little or no value to the interest in the building.") (emphasis in original), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 942 (1954); Geneva Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 764, 771 (1977)
("Petitioners paid nothing for any substantial immediate interest in the improvements ... ,"),
ajfd, 622 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1980); Quilliam, supra note 1, at 276-77 (''The decisive factor is
that [the purchaser] has not invested in the building since it is not reasonable to assume that
any part of the purchase price was paid for improvements which will not result in a present
return . . . ."). However, the mere existence of the building may in some cases constitute a
value that is reflected in the purchase price. See Lurie, supra note 49, at 48-49. That value will
be discussed in the contexts of reversionary value, see notes 76-92 i,!fra and accompanying
text, and premium value, see notes 94-108 i,!fra and accompanying text.
68. Courts sometimes differ in determining which of the requirements for depreciability,
see notes 17-28 supra and accompanying text, have not been met. However, they generally
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However, the court in World Publishing Co. v. Commissioner 69
and at least one commentator70 have concluded that the purchaser
should be allowed to depreciate a lessee-constructed building during
the lease term, arguing that an inquiry into whether the lessee or the
lessor constructed the building "seems to be illogical, to emphasize a
historical fact not participated in or caused by the purchaser and not
of any other considered economic consequence to him." 71 But the
purchaser does encounter differing economic consequences depending upon whether the lease requires the lessor or the lessee72 to construct and maintain the building.73 If the lessee constructs the
building, the purchaser will pay less for the property because the
building's value to the lessee will not be reflected in the annual rents
paid for the property's use. In contrast, a lessor-constructed building
would yield higher rentals because the lessee would pay rent both for
the land and for the lessor's building - the value of these higher
rentals would be reflected in the purchase price for the whole property. Further, the purchaser has the obligation to maintain the building.74 Thus, courts and commentators have properly rejected the
agree that no depreciation is allowable. See Geneva Drive In Theatre, Inc. v. Commissioner,
622 F.2d 995, 997 (9th Cir. 1980) ("First, [taxpayers] did not hold the improvements for the
production of income. Second, the taxpayers' investment in the improvements did not erode
prior to [the termination of the lease]. They did not suffer economic loss from obsolescence or
use . . . .") (citations omitted); M. DeMatteo Constr. Co. v. United States, 433 F.2d 1263,
1265 (1st Cir. 1970) (there was no rationale for establishing a basis in the building since the
purchaser acquired "no interest of any substance"); First Natl. Bank v. Nee, 190 F.2d 61, 64-67
(8th Cir. 1951) (holding that bank building was not held for the production of income); Bernstein v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 1146, 1151 (1954) ("[T]here is no evidence ... upon which we
may determine a basis for depreciation . . . ."), qffd, 230 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1956); Commissioner v. Moore, 207 F.2d 265, 271-72 (9th Cir. 1953) (whatever interest the taxpayer has in
the building is not wasting), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 942 (1954); Rev. Rul. 60-180, 1960-1 C.B.
114, 116.
69. 299 F.2d 614 (8th Cir. 1962).
10. See Rubin,supra note 1, at 1146-1148;seealso 3B J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, FEDERAL
INCOME, GIFT AND EsTATE TAXATION § 41.14(2) (1983).
71. 299 F.2d at 621-22.
72. See notes 44-45 supra and accompanying text.
73. See Quilliam, supra note 1, at 284.
74. Rubin poses a hypothetical that illustrates some of the arguments surrounding this
point:
Suppose A and X in 1928 own adjoining lots of equal value. A lets his lot for 50 years
at an annual rental of$10,000, and the lessee then constructs a building with an expected
life of 45 years, the building to revert to A upon termination of the lease. At the same
time X constructs a similar building of the same cost and expected life, but does not make
a long-term lease until 1933, at which time he makes one for 45 years at an annual rental
of only $10,000, the decline in rental value being due to the depression. In 1950, Band Y
purchase the properties from A and X, respectively, for equal amounts. They thus have
equal investments in substantially identical interests in property: each acquires the right to
$10,000 per year for 28 years and the reversionary rights in equivalent physical assets.
The extent of the exhaustible interest of each must necessarily be the same. No reason is
apparent for allowing depreciation to Y while denying it to B.
Rubin,supra note 1, at 1147 n.43. However, this analysis is inadequate. Assume that the value
of X's land in 1933 is $6000 annually and that the value of the building at that time is $4000
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result reached by World Publishing. 75
annually. The analysis of B's and Y's depreciation rights in 1950 must take into account what
the current market value of their land would be if it were unimproved.
First, if the unimproved value of each lot in 1950 is $6000 per year, then both Y and B have
wasting assets; neither of their respective properties will generate $10,000 per year indefinitely.
But the character of the wasting assets differs. For Y, who purchased property featuring a
lessor-constructed building, the depreciable property is the building. See notes 56-65 supra
and accompanying text. The rental payment negotiated before the commencement of a lease
would presumably take into account the combined value of the land and the building. Thus, Y
will continue to receive income attributable to the building during and after the lease term
only so long as the building exists. B, on the other hand, will receive the additional $4000 per
year for the remaining term of the lease regardless of the lessee-constructed building's existence. See note 66 supra. Instead, the lease generates income to the extent that the current
value of the land subject to the lease exceeds the market value of the land. Part III advocates
depreciating this "premium value" over the term of the lease. See notes 94-107 i'!fra and
accompanying text. Unlike Y's building, however, B's premium value asset is subject to the
restricted depreciation methods appropriate for intangible assets. See notes 106-08 i'!fra and
accompanying text. B may also have purchased a reversion in the building. This reversionary
asset would be depreciable when the lease terminates. See notes 76-92 i'!fra and accompanying text.
Second, if the unimproved value of each lot in 1950 is at least equal to the total lease value
- $10,000 per year - then one might argue that neither Y nor B has an asset depreciable
during the lease term. Y's and B's interests are seemingly not wasting because, regardless of
the buildings or the leases, each lot is presumed capable of generating $10,000 indefinitely.
See notes 20-23 supra and accompanying text. The rationale of this Note would, in these
circumstances, produce an apparently anomalous result: Y would have a depreciable interest
in the lessor-constructed building while the lease is in force, see notes 56-65 supra and accompanying text, whereas B would have no depreciable interest in the lessee-constructed building,
see notes 66-68 supra and accompanying text. See Rubin, supra note 1, at 1149.
This "anomaly" is explainable, however. Y should be viewed as having purchased two
assets from the lessor - the land and the building. The land generates $6000 annually during
the lease term and will generate at least S10,000 when the lease terminates. Ignoring reversionary value, the building generates $4000 under the lease as long as it continues to exist. See note
49 supra. Since the building's useful life is finite, it is a wasting asset and should be depreciable in Y's hands. See Quilliam, supra note I, at 284-85.
The argument that Y has no depreciable asset must be based on assumptions that are not
accepted in tax law. That argument focuses on Y's total income during the lease -$10,000and notes that this amount presumably will not decrease because the land alone is worth that
much. This point ignores the fact that Y has acquired separate assets. Y's building is depreciating in value with the passing of each year under the lease. Y must maintain that building to
be assured of building rental income. See note 49 supra. The land's value, which is based on
the value of expected future income flows from the land, is appreciating as the end of the lease
draws nearer. See note 122i'!fra and accompanying text. When the lease terminates, the land
will not be constrained to the $6000 lease amount. Thus, only by combining the values of each
asset and using the land appreciation to offset the building depreciation can one argue that Y
does not have a wasting "asset." But the tax law does not allow such an aggregation; depreciation is separate from appreciation, especially where separate assets are involved. See Fribourg
Navigation Co. v. Commissioner, 383 U.S. 272, 276 (1966) (depreciation is allowable although
the asset has appreciated in value; the Service cannot "[commingle] two distinct and established concepts of tax accounting- depreciation of an asset through wear and tear or gradual
expiration of useful life and fluctuations in the value of that asset through changes in price
levels or market values"); M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 12, ~ 5.01 (discussing the generally
accepted tax law principle that unrealized appreciation should not be recognized as income).
Finally, although B might not have a depreciable asset during the lease term, B may have
purchased a valuable reversion in the lessee-constructed building. This reversionary interest
should be depreciable when the lease terminates. See notes 76-92 infra and accompanying
text. In contrast, any expected reversionary value of Y's building is reflected in the basis that
Y acquired in the building. See note 57 supra. That basis is depreciated during the lease term,
75. The court in M. DeMatteo Constr. Co. v. United States, 433 F.2d 1263 (1st Cir. 1970),
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Nevertheless, the purchaser may acquire some depreciable interest in a lessee-constructed building. Possession of the building will
generally revert to the lessor upon termination of the lease.76 When
the lessor conveys all of his interest to the purchaser, this reversionary right will be valuable to the extent that the lessor and the purchaser expect that the building will generate income upon
termination of the lease.77 The purchaser will compensate the lessor
for this valuable right and will thus receive a basis in the building.78
Because the building will still be a wasting asset, 79 the purchaser
should be entitled to depreciation. 80
However, the purchaser's right to depreciate the reversion should
explicitly rejected the World Publishing result. 433 F.2d at 1265. Further, the tax court in
Geneva Drive In Theatre, Inc. v. Co=issioner, 67 T.C. 764, 772-74 (1977), affd., 622 F.2d
995 (9th Cir. 1980), using reasoning approved on appeal, 622 F.2d at 997, indicated that World
Publishing is better viewed as a premium value case. See also Co=ent, supra note 8, at 48992 (interpreting World Publishing as a premium value case). For a discussion of premium
value, see notes 94-108 in.fro and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., Geneva Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Co=issioner, 622 F.2d 995,996 (9th Cir.
1980); World Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 614, 616 (8th Cir. 1962) ("upon the
termination of this lease, by the expiration of its term or by default or otherwise").
77. See M. DeMatteo Constr. Co. v. United States, 433 F.2d 1263, 1265 (1st Cir. 1970)
("Where . . . the [lessee-constructed] building's useful life will expire before the purchaser
gains possession of it, and there is no indication the purchaser believes otherwise, the selling
lessor has nothing to sell except bare legal title, and the purchaser buys nothing more.") (emphasis added); Geneva Drive-In Theatre, Inc., 67 T.C. 764, 771 (1977) ("The purchase price
. . . paid . . . no doubt took into account the fact[ ] that, under the lease, the . . . [lesseeconstructed] improvements would not become [the purchasers'] property until the lease terminated . . . ."), affd., 622 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1980); Quilliam, supra note l, at 283 ("[I]t is
' logical to assume that a portion of [the] purchase price was paid for the reversionary right to
the [lessee-constructed] building when the lease expires.").
The lessor and purchaser will also fix through their negotiations a purchase value that will
take into account the possibility that the present lessee may default before the lease expires, in
which case the building could generate rental income for the purchaser at an early date. Indeed, "it is unrealistic to ignore the possibility that the lease will be broken; surely the purchaser has paid, at least in part, for the assurance that he will have a building to lease to
someone else if the present lessee defaults." 3B J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME
GIFT & ESTATE TAXATION§ 41.14(2), at 4180-81 (1983).
78. See Geneva Drive In Theatre, Inc. v. Commissioner, 622 F.2d 995, 996 (9th Cir. 1980)
(noting that the taxpayer and the Commissioner have agreed that a portion of the purchase
price is allocable to improvements); Rev. Rul. 60-180, 1960-1 C.B. 114, 116 (allocation of basis
to reversion); see also I.R.C. § 1012 (1982) (taxpayer basis is cost).
Thus, even though the lessor had no basis in the improvements, the purchaser acquires one
because of the arm's length purchase. At least one court has concluded that this result is
anomalous. See M. DeMatteo Constr. Co. v. United States, 310 F.Supp. 1313, 1315-16 (D.
Mass.), affd., 433 F.2d 1263 (1st Cir. 1970). However, were it not for the statutory exception to
income recognition principles embodied in I.R.C. § 109 (1982), see note 45 supra, the original
lessor would receive a basis in a lessee-constructed building that survived the lease term. See
Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461 (1940) (before I.R.C. § 109, a lessor had to recognize income
at the termination of the lease in the amount of the value oflessee-constructed improvements);
I.R.C. § IO 19 (1982) (no basis adjustment to lessor if§ 109 excludes income; basis adjustment
allowed if income recognized under Bruun). Thus, the fact that the purchaser receives a basis
while the lessor does not is not actually anomalous.
79. See notes 20-23 supra and accompanying text.
80. See notes 17-28 supra and accompanying text.
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begin only when the lease terminates. While the lease is in force, the
purchaser's interest in the building is not wasting. The purchaser's
acquired interest in the lessee-constructed building is by definition
inchoate - the purchaser acquires "only a reversionary interest in
the improvements which [will] ripen into ownership and the right to
possession only upon the termination of the lease." 81 Until the purchaser receives possession, the exact nature of the interest in the
building is indeterminable. Thus, although the building itself is
wasting during the lease term, the purchaser's interest is not. 82 Instead, the wasting that occurs during the term of the lease is merely
one determinant of the asset that the purchaser will ultimately
acquire. 83
81. Geneva Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 764, 772 (1977), affd., 622
F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1980). The court also noted that "the purchase price . . . paid . . . no doubt
took into account the fact[ ] ... that [the purchaser] would receive (the lessee-constructed
improvements] in their deteriorated condition as of the lease termination date." Id. at 771
(emphasis added).
82. Geneva Drive In Theatre, Inc. v. Commissioner, 622 F.2d 995, 997 (9th Cir. 1980)
("[T]he taxpayers' investment in the improvements did not erode prior to [the termination of
the lease]. They did not suffer economic loss from obsolescence or use . . . .") (citation
omitted).
83. One could argue, however, that a portion of the purchaser's investment is wasting during the lease term and, therefore, should be currently depreciable. The purchaser may have
paid part of the cost of the building for the prospect that the lease may end prematurely. See
note 77 supra. Indeed, where no building is expected to survive the lease term, any investment
in the building is attributable to the chance of an early reversion. Therefore, as each year
passes under the lease, the income producing life of the building is diminished because an
early reversion would have a decreased duration, if it ever occurred at all. This diminution in
the potential return on the purchaser's investment suggests the existence of a depreciable interest. See Lurie, supra note 49, at 48-49; Kahn, supra note 9, at 35 (footnote omilted):
[Property can] be subdivided temporally, and so should we allocate a taxpayer's basis to
each subdivided year according to the amount that the taxpayer paid for the right to the
property for that year. When a year of an asset's life is used up, depreciation should be
allowed in the amount of the taxpayer's basis that is allocated to that year.
This theoretical argument fails, however, when the statutory depreciation allowance is ap•
plied to the purchaser's interest. The purchaser has invested in a tangible asset - the lessee•
constructed building, see note 78 supra and accompanying text, although his interest is inchoate, see note 81 supra and accompanying text. That the purchaser determined the value of his
interest in the building with reference to the lease's existence does not alter the nature of this
interest. Cf. Millinery Center Building Corp. v. Co=issioner, 350 U.S. 456, 460 (1956)
(lessee purchasing fee interest from lessor acquired additional rights to land and lessee-constructed building which he had been leasing; "[t]hese rights are assets with useful lives having
no reference to the term of the lease"), qffg. 221 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1955); 350 U.S. at 461
("Petitioner has acquired two assets - land and a building - whose use it will have for the
remainder of their useful lives, and petitioner therefore cannot amortize the cost allocable to
the acquisition of the wasting asset [the building] over the term of the extinguished lease.");
221 F.2d at 324 (noting that purchaser acquired a reversionary interest in the building that
constituted an "investment in the building"; there is "a new purchase price covering a building
to be recovered taxwise, as is any building cost, over the period of its useful life"). Thus, as
each year passes under the lease, the value of the purchaser's interest in the building may
change, but that change in market value alone does not influence depreciability. See Fribourg
Navigation Co. v. Co=issioner, 383 U.S. 272, 276 (1966); Geneva Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 67 T.C. 764, 771 n.7 (1977), affd., 622 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1980); Treas. Reg,
§ l.167(a)-l(a), T.D. 6712, 1964-1 (Pt. I) C.B. 106, 108. Rather, the focus is on the building as
the asset and the question is when the purchaser's inchoate interest in the building is deprecia-
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In addition, the lessee-constructed building produces no income
for the purchaser during the term of the lease. 84 One could reply by
arguing that the asset need not actually produce income so long as it
is employed in an income-producing context. 85 The income-producing context is arguably sufficient because the land on which the
building rests is subject to an income-producing lease, and because
the building is related both to the lease and to the land. 86 This argument fails for three reasons. First, unlike property that does not produce income in a particular year, the value of the reversion is totally
incapable of producing income for the purchaser during the lease
term. 87 Second, the land and the building should be considered separate assets. 88 Last and most important, the policy of depreciation
weighs against concluding that the lessee-constructed building is currently producing income. Depreciation is an attempt to match income with the costs required to produce it. 89 Since the building will
produce income and incur costs for the purchaser only after the lease
terminates, depreciation should not be permitted until after the reversion occurs.
Thus, while the lease remains in force, the purchaser cannot depreciate the lessee-constructed building. At the lease's termination,
however, the purchaser is free to use the building - clearly a tangible asset - to generate income.90 Only then would depreciation be
appropriate;91 only then would the purchaser's interest meet the reble. Until the lease terminates and the purchaser takes possession, that interest is not wasting
because it is indeterminate, see notes 81-82 supra and accompanying text, nor is it producing
income for the purchaser, see notes 84-89 i'!fra and accompanying text. Depreciation, therefore, must await the time at which the purchaser takes possession. See Cooper v. Co=issioner, 542 F.2d 599,601 (2d Cir. 1976) (depreciation allowance not permissible until taxpayer
places asset in service); Sears Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 359 F.2d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 1966) ("depreciation may be taken when depreciable property is available for use"); SMC Corp. v.
United States, 675 F.2d 113, 114 (6th Cir. 1982); Treas. Reg. § l.167(a)-I0(b) (1956).
84. See Geneva Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Co=issioner, 622 F.2d 995,997 (9th Cir. 1980);
Schubert v. Commissioner, 286 F.2d 573,580 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 960 (1961); First
Natl. Bank v. Nee, 190 F.2d 61, 66 (8th Cir. 1951); Goelet v. United States, 161 F.Supp. 305,
310-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), qffd., 266 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1959); note 66 supra and accompanying
text.
85. See notes 24-28 supra and accompanying text.
86. See World Publishing Co. v. Co=issioner, 299 F.2d 614, 617 (8th Cir. 1962).
87. See First Natl. Bank v. Nee, 190 F.2d 61, 66-68 (8th Cir. 1951); Quilliam, supra note I,
at 279.
88. See note 74 supra.
89. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
90. See note 76 supra and accompanying text. If no reversion in the building exists when
the lease is terminated, the taxpayer would presumably be allowed a loss deduction under
I.R.C. § 165 (1982), which would be allowable only in the year the lease terminates - that is,
when it is "fixed by identifiable events." Treas. Reg.§ 1.165-l(b), (d)(l), T.D. 6735, 1964-1 (Pt.
I) C.B. 100, 101.
91. See Geneva Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 764 (1977), qffd., 622
F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1980); Rev. Ru!. 60-180, 1960-1 C.B. 114, I 16; Quilliam, supra note I, at 284.
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quirements for depreciability. 92

Ill.

DEPRECIABILITY ARISING FROM THE LEASE

Although the most common and possibly the most valuable depreciable asset that the purchaser will acquire is a building on the
property,93 it may not be the only one. The property is purchased
subject to a lease, and certain characteristics of a lease suggest that it,
too, may be a depreciable asset: It has a definite duration and, therefore, a limited life; it arguably produces income; and the purchaser
has arguably paid for the right to receive income under it. This Part
contends that the existence of a lease gives rise to a depreciable, intangible asset, but only when the income it generates as to individual
assets exceeds current market rental values. In all other cases, the
lease is inconsequential for tax purposes.
A. .Depreciable Premium Value
When the purchaser acquires the property subject to the lease,
that lease may cause particular assets to be more valuable under the
lease than they otherwise would be. The rental income attributable
to each asset is fixed by the lease for the lease's duration. 94 At the
time of purchase, the lease may assure that rental income for a particular asset exceeds the rents that the asset would generate if a new
lease were negotiated at that time. 95 This disparity between lease
rentals and current market rentals could arise in a number of ways.
Perhaps the most common example96 is a decrease in the market
value of the leased land, with a consequent decrease in rental
value.97 Second, the lease rentals may provide a higher rate of return than what is currently obtainable because of a decrease in the
market rates of return on unimproved land. 98 Third, the value of a
92. See notes 17-28 supra and accompanying text.
93. See notes 43-46 supra and accompanying text.
94. If the land features only lessee-constructed improvements, then all of the rent is attributable to the land. See notes 66-67 supra and accompanying text. If there are lessor-constructed improvements on the land, then a portion of the rent is attributable to those
improvements, see note 56 supra and accompanying text, while the remainder of the rent is
attributable to the land.
95. See, e.g., Quilliam, supra note l, at 261-62 ("Chas purchased land which Ifnot leased
would presently be worth $80,000 and which could be expected to bring a return of $4,800
annually at present market rates. But the property is leased for forty more years and will
return $6,000 annually during this period.") (emphasis in original).
96. See Rubin, supra note l, at l 135.
91. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Moore, 207 F.2d 265, 277 (9th Cir. 1953) ("Some of the
witnesses who testified . . . attributed the falling off of rentals since the lease was made, to the
movement of merchandising business away from downtown Los Angeles . . . ."), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 942 (1954); Kokjer v. United States, 70-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~9385 (N.D. Cal.
1970) (store building leased at 3% of monthly sales; going rate at time of purchase was 2.5%),
98. Quilliam, supra note l, at 271 (hypothetical where market value of land remains
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lessor's right under the lease may have increased since the date that
the lease was entered into, so that the lessor would be forced to decrease rent in order to receive that right currently. 99
Because of this disparity between lease and market rentals, the
lease is deemed a "favorable" 100 or "premium" 101 lease. The price
that the purchaser pays to acquire the property subject to the lease
should reflect these premium rentals; in essence, the purchaser pays
for a particular asset at its current value and pays more for the right,
under the lease, to premium rentals attributable to that asset. 102
$100,000 but market rate ofretum on unimproved land drops from 6% to 5%, with the result
that the lease rental of $6000 exceeds the market rental of $5000).
99. For examples of rights the lessor might reserve, see World Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 614, 616-17 (8th Cir. 1962) (including lessor right to mortgage lessee-constructed buildings). An example will illustrate the point. Suppose the lessee of a given lot
originally agreed to remove snow from publicly used sidewalks. If the cost of snow removal
increased unexpectedly since the original lease date, a lessor at the time of purchase might be
forced to accede to a rental reduction in order to receive that same benefit.
However, the presence of a lessee-constructed building on the property at the time of
purchase does not necessarily give rise to a disparity in rentals. Some commentators have
argued that the presence of the building is valuable because it decreases the risk of lessee
default. See Lurie, supra note 49, at 48; Quilliam, supra note I, at 272. Cf. Geneva Drive-In
Theatre, Inc. v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 764, 772 (1977), qfjd, 622 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1980)
(court noting argument). But if the lease mandates the existence of the lessee-constructed
building, the lower risk will be reflected in lower lease rentals. See Comment, supra note 8, at
490 n.25. Further, the lease rentals should only be compared with market rentals obtainable
under a lease that also requires a lessee-constructed building. See note 102 i'!fra. Thus, the
question is whether the value to the lessor of this lessee obligation has increased since the lease
originated.
100. E.g., Commissioner v. Moore, 207 F.2d 265, 273 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
942 (1954); Rubin, supra note l, at 1134.
IOI. E.g., Midler Court Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 521 F.2d 767, 768 (3d Cir. 1975);
Quilliam, supra note I, at 266; Comment, supra note 8, at 489.
102. See Commissioner v. Moore, 207 F.2d 265, 274 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
942 (1954), on remand, 24 T.C.M. (P-H) ~ 55,219 (1955):
[I)fwe were dealing with a taxpayer who ... purchased [an interest in the property], and
if it appeared that at that time the rents being paid were in excess of the fair market
rentals of the property, and if the price paid took this latter fact into consideration, it must
have included a bonus or premium for the acquisition of the "favorable" features of the
lease.
See also Quilliam, supra note l, at 262-63 ("C is investing not only in land, . . . but he is also
investing in the contractual right to receive an additional $1,200 per year in rentals.").
The value of premium rentals as to each asset can be defined in two ways. First, it can be
viewed as the amount by which the current market value of the asset subject to the lease
("lease value") exceeds the current market value of the asset ("market value"). Current value
in each case should be calculated in present value terms. See Moore, 207 F.2d at 276 (referring
to "capitalized value of the rentals"); Quilliam, supra note l, at 262 (referring to the "present
value of expectant lease rentals, discounting them at a rate appropriate to the risk of the investment"); Comment, supra note 8, at 489 (citing May v. Commissioner, 13 T.C.M. (P-H) ~
44,242 (1944)).
The second definition begins by splitting both the market and the lease value into two
components. The first component is the asset-attributable current value of anticipated rental
payments for the remaining term of the lease. This first component of the lease value is determined by the terms of the actual lease; a hypothetical market lease is used to ascertain the
market value component. The hypothetical market lease is identical to the actual lease except
for the rental rate. See Moore, 201 F.2d at 276 ("rents a similar lease would command"). This
identity is necessary because altering the parties' rights and obligations might affect rental rates
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The premium rental right that the purchaser acquires for a given
asset should be a depreciable asset in his hands. First, the asset is
wasting since the income stream the purchaser pays for is a finite
one; by definition, the right to premium rentals expires upon termination of the lease. 103 Second, the asset is clearly producing inand distort the calculation. See Co=ent, supra note 8, at 490 n.25; note 99 supra and accom•
panying text.
The second component of this definition is the current value of the asset at the termination
of the lease - the reversionary value. Because the reversionary value of the actual lease is
equal to that of the hypothetical market lease, the premium value can also be defined as the
difference between the value of the actual lease and the value of hypothetical market lease.
See Moore, 201 F.2d at 276; Co=ent, supra note 8, at 489.
Rubin's definition parallels the first one outlined above, see Rubin, supra note 1, at 1143,
with one unacceptable difference. He views the lease value as an aggregation of the values of
all assets on the property and only considers the market value of the land See id at 1143-45.
He is willing, however, to allocate a proper amount of basis to the improvements in order to
reflect their reversionary value. See id. at 1150-51. Thus, this difference affects the treatment
of improvements during the lease term. The faults in this approach were examined earlier.
See notes 69-75 supra and accompanying text. Further, this approach improperly offsets a
"discount" attributable to one asset against a premium for another. See note 125 i'!fra.
103. See Co=issioner v. Moore, 207 F.2d 265, 274 (9th Cir. 1953) ("[l)t may be possible
to prove that the higher rents secured through the premium paid by such a purchaser would be
exhausted and terminated when the lease ends . . . . The lease, or rather the portion thereof
providing the above-normal rents, is an intangible asset with a definitely limited life."), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 942 (1954); Quilliam, supra note l, at 262-63; Rubin, supra note 1, at 1135,
ll4l; Comment, supra note 8, at 492.
The popular way of viewing the wasting asset is to recognize the premium value as a sepa•
rate asset, apart from the underlying asset, with no salvage value. See Moore, 207 F.2d at 274;
Quilliam, supra note l, at 262-63 (asset is a "contractual right to receive an additional $1,200
per year in rentals"); Rubin, supra note l, at 1141 ("Here it [is] sought ..• to allocate to the
lease only that part of the total value which is in excess of what would otherwise have been the
value of the land . . . .").
However, this approach faces a conceptual criticism. Premium value is arguably not a separate asset because it derives its value from a portion oflease rentals attributable to the underlying asset. Because the lease fixes the underlying asset's rental income, see note 94 supra and
accompanying text, that value is insulated from market forces, see note 56 supra. The question
that arises is whether those market forces can nonetheless be considered as the source of a
separate asset when the purchaser acquires the underlying asset subject to the lease.
First, where the value of a contract right decreases with time, courts have been willing to
recognize the costs incurred to acquire that right as a separate depreciable asset. See, e.g.,
Laird v. United States, 556 F.2d 1224, 1231-35 (5th Cir. 1977) (depreciation allowable for cost
of football players' contracts; key factor is ascertainable value), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014
(1978); Co=issioner v. Seaboard Finance Co., 367 F.2d 646, 652-53 (9th Cir. 1966) (portion
of premium paid for loan contracts was depreciable); Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 630, 635-36 (1953), acq. 1954-l C.B. 6. This judicial willingness has also extended to costs incurred to secure leases. See, e.g., Young v. Commissioner, 20 B.T.A. 692,695
(1930) (costs incurred and remaining basis in buildings demolished to secure a lease held depreciable over lease term), affd, 59 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1932). The premium rental right that the
purchaser pays for falls within the rationale of these cases because it, too, is intended to secure
a valuable lease and is separate from the underlying asset. This conclusion is supported by the
fact that the lessor could have sold the lease and the property separately; if the lease were truly
favorable, the lessor could have released the lessee from his obligations under the lease for
value, set up a new lease with the lessee at current market rates, and then sold the property to
the purchaser at a lower price subject to the new market lease.
Second, amortization of premiums paid for bonds, which the Code allows, suggests a useful
analogy. Where the interest return on a bond exceeds current market rates, the bond purchaser must pay a premium for that excess return. Hanover Bank v. Commissioner, 369 U.S.
672, 677 (1962). The purchaser will receive a lesser amount, the bond's principal amount or
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redemption price, on retirement or redemption. Rather than requiring the purchaser to merely
recognize a capital loss on that disposal of the bond, I.R.C. § 171 (1982) allows a bondholder
to amortize the premium paid over the life of the bond, thereby offsetting the interest income
the purchaser must recognize. See l B. BITIKER, supra note 14, ~ 26.3. "[I]nterest is taxable to
the recipient, and when a premium has been paid the actual interest received is not a true
reflection of the bond's yield, but represents in part a return of the premium paid." Hanover
Bank, 369 U.S. at 677. The same principle should apply to the premium paid for a lease: the
premium derives from lease rents more valuable than market rents, and the asset's value at the
end of the lease will be lower than the value subject to the lease.
That a specific Code section allows amortizability of a bond premium should not preclude
depreciability of a lease premium. A Code section was necessary because the Supreme Court
had explicitly rejected bond premium depreciability. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Edwards,
271 U.S. 109, 116 (1926); H. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1942). But, as noted
above, courts have generally allowed depreciation of other valuable contract rights. Further,
courts have not clearly rejected lease premium depreciability, as they had with bond premiums. See note 107 i,!fra. Thus, one cannot make an expressio unius argument against lease
premium depreciability.
Third, the strong policy that favors depreciating the cost of premium value also supports
the separate asset approach, which facilitates depreciation. Depreciation deductions are allowed to match the cost incurred in the course of generating a finite income stream with the
income generated. See notes 15-16 & 21 supra and accompanying text. Where premium value
exists, that policy is applicable. See Moore, 207 F.2d at 274; Quilliam, supra note I, at 262-63;
Rubin, supra note 1, at I 135.
Despite the sound rationale for recognizing premium value as a wasting asset, commentators have suggested that when land is the leased asset, the courts require too strong a showing
that the asset is wasting. See Quilliam, supra note I, at 275-76; Rubin, supra note I, at 1142.
The courts seem to require that the purchaser show that the rental value of the property at the
end of the lease will be less than the lease rental. See Commissioner v. Moore, 207 F.2d 265,
277 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 942 (1954), on remand, 24 T.C.M. (P-H) ~ 55,219
(1955); Friend v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 768, 771-72 (1939) qffd., 119 F.2d 959 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 673 (1941). The commentators suggest that the purchaser pays for the
excess oflease rents over market rents, which excess is reflected as premium value, and that the
purchaser should receive credit through depreciation for the cost so incurred. See, e.g., Rubin,
supra note l, at 1142; see also Quilliam, supra note I, at 276 n.80 (citing Moore, 24 T.C.M. (PH) at 729). These commentators claim that rental value at the end of the lease is irrelevant.
The different treatment that tax law grants to wasting and nonwasting assets underlies this
dispute. When the focus is on the premium value as a separate asset, the commentators' view
appears to be the better one because, as indicated above, the premium value is wasting. But if
the focus is on the land as a nonwasting asset, the courts' view is more intelligible. If the
rentals from the land will not diminish when the lease terminates, then regardless of lower
market rents in the interim, the land subject to the lease is as a nonwasting asset. See notes 2023 supra and accompanying text; see also Lurie, supra note 49, at 54.
An example offered by Profesor Quilliam illustrates how the land subject to the lease might
be viewed as not wasting. In the example, lease rentals are $6000 annually and market rentals
are currently $4800 annually. See note 95 supra. If market rentals available when the lease
terminates in 40 years are expected to rise to at least $6000 annually, then the land subject to
the lease appears to be capable of generating $6000 annually ad infinitum, and the commentators' wasting asset disappears.
The courts' view can be analogized to salvage value principles. The asset could be viewed
as the value of the land subject to the lease. This asset's salvage value, see note 22 supra, is the
value of the land when the lease terminates, which represents the recoverable portion of the
investment in land. See notes 22-23 supra and accompanying text. The wasting portion of the
investment in land is that amount of the premium that is not recoverable once the lease expires. See note 22supra and accompanying text; cf. I.R.C. § 171 (1982) (amortization of premium paid for bonds). Professor Kahn suggests that the application of salvage value
principles to land and other nonwasting assets may explain why those assets are not depreciable. See Kahn, supra note 9, at 41-42. Professor Kahn notes: "As long as the tax laws do not
discount salvage value to present value, a nonwasting asset's salvage value will equal its
purchase price, and no cost recovery should be allowed." Id at 42.
This salvage value concept can be applied to Professor Quilliam's example. The asset is the
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come; 104 for the term of the lease, the lease generates excess rental
income105 for the pertinent asset. Thus, the purchaser should be en-

titled to allocate the cost of the wasting intangible asset 106 to income
periods through depreciation deductions over the remaining term of
the lease. 107 Moreover, a portion of the value of a lessor-constructed
land subject to the lease - an asset that will generate $6000 indefinitely (under the lease and
after the lease terminates). The salvage value is the value of an asset that will also generate
$6000 indefinitely. Since salvage value is not discounted, see note 22 StJpra, the two values
cancel and the wasting amount is zero.
The rigors of the courts' approach can and should be avoided. The fault in their analysis
lies in the fact that it allows future market appreciation, which is speculative, to influence the
court's determination of appropriate depreciation deductions. See Fribourg Navigation Co. v.
Commissioner, 383 U.S. 272, 276 (1966) (it is improper to "(commingle] two distinct and established concepts of tax accounting - depreciation of an asset through wear and tear or
gradual expiration of useful life and fluctuations in the value of that asset through changes in
price levels or market values"); Kahn,StJpra note 9, at 31-32 ("(F]luctuations in market prices
do not, and should not affect the proper amount of depreciation that is allowable for tax purposes."); note 74supra. Courts can reach the proper result, treating the full premium as wasting without requiring a showing as to future rental value, by adhering strictly to the separate
asset approach. They can still justify this treatment under salvage value principles by viewing
the current market value of the land as the salvage value. See Quilliam, supra note 1, at 262
n.4; cf. Michaelis v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1175, 1179 (1970) (there is no wasting asset where
land is acquired subject to a lease that generates current market rentals because "the land may
again be rented at the same fair market rental") (emphasis added).
104. See notes 24-28 supra and accompanying text.
105. See note 95 supra and accompanying text.
106. Where the acquisition of valuable contract rights gives rise to an asset, that asset is
considered intangible. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Moore, 207 F.2d 265, 274 (9th Cir. 1953),
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 942 (1954); Laird v. United States, 556 F.2d 1224, 1231 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978); Commissioner v. Seaboard Finance Co., 367 F.2d 646, 653
(9th Cir. 1966).
107. See notes 17-28 supra and accompanying text. Although the elements of a depreciable interest are present, courts have not always embraced depreciability of premium value,
One court has explicitly accepted the concept where the property consisted of land and a
lessee-constructed building. See Commissioner v. Moore, 207 F.2d 265, 273-78 (9th Cir. 1953),
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 942 (1954), on remand, 24 T.C.M. (P-H) ~ 55,219 (1955). In several cases,
the court avoided deciding on premium value grounds because of insufficient proof. See Midler Court Realty v. Commissioner, 521 F.2d 767, 770-71 (3d Cir. 1975); Schubert v. Commissioner, 286 F.2d 573, 580-83 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 366 U.S. 960 (1961); Fieland v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C. 743, 755-56 (1980); Geneva Drive-In Theatre Inc. v. Commissioner, 67
T.C. 764, 770 (1977), ajfd, 622 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1980); Michaelis v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.
1175, 1179 (1970); Bernstein v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 1146, 1151-52 (1954), ajfd, 230 F.2d
603 (2d Cir. 1956). Insufficient proof may be a proper reason for failing to recognize premium
value, see notes 142-44 infra and accompanying text, but it may also be an improper reason.
See note 103 supra. For other courts that have noted the theory, see Winn-Dixie Montgomery,
Inc. v. United States, 444 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1971); Kokjer v. United States, 70-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
~ 9385 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
Some courts have explicitly rejected premium value depreciability where the premium
value claimed was attributable to the taxpayer's interest in land. See Midler Court Realty v.
Commissioner, 61 T.C. 590, 595-96 (1974), ajfd on other grounds, 521 F.2d 767 (3d Cir. 1975);
Schubert v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 1048, 1053-54 (1960), ajfd, 286 F.2d 573 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 960 (1961); Friend v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 768 (1939), ajfd, I 19 F.2d 959
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 673 (1941). These courts reasoned that the right to rents and,
therefore, premium value, was derived from the fee interest in the land, which is nondepreciable. See, e.g., Friend, 40 B.T.A. at 771. This rationale, however, has been effectively rebutted.
See Quilliam,StJpra note I, at 267-74; Rubin,supra note I, at 1138-42;see also note 103stq,ra;
cf. Cleveland Allerton Hotel, Inc. v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 805, 807 (6th Cir. 1948) (holding
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building subject to a lease is not depreciable as a tangible asset to the
extent that premium value is attributable to that _building. 108
B. Market and Below Market Leases
Where the lease secures only market value rentals for a given
asset, the lease will not be depreciable as to that asset. 109 The asset is
being held for the production of income under the lease 110 and the
lease will not secure rentals inde:finitely. 111 But because those rentals are available in the market, 112 the lease does not secure any right
to income in excess of the value of the underlying asset. 113 Therefore, the purchaser will invest solely in the underlying asset 114 and
not in any right under the lease. Because there is no investment in
the lease, 115 it is not depreciable. 116
Similarly, it is not significant for tax purposes if the lease rents
that portion of lessee's cost in purchasing fee from lessor could be considered a deductible
expense to escape a burdensome lease and need not be considered merely an investment in the
fee).
108. The character of the underlying asset should not produce a different treatment of
premium value. Regardless of whether that asset is land or a lessor-constructed building, premium value derives from the lease and not the asset, see notes 102-03 supra and accompanying
text, although in either case the receipt of premium rentals attributable to the asset depends on
the continued existence of the asset. Thus, even where the underlying asset is a building, the
separate investment in the right to receive above-market rents over the term of the lease is an
intangible asset, see note 106 supra and accompanying text, that is not entitled to the liberal
depreciation rules available to tangible assets. See notes 41-42supra and accompanying text.
No case has discussed premium value attributable to a lessor-constructed building. Two
factors might explain this omission. First, before ACRS, the difference between straight line
depreciation of a used building over its useful life and straight line depreciation of premium
value attributable to that building over the lease term was probably too small to raise the
question. In contrast, ACRS, which applies only to tangible assets, see note 34 supra, will
result in a larger difference in relative depreciation; for recovery property, useful life is generally ignored, see note 31 supra, and accelerated depreciation is not restricted to new property.
Compare I.R.C. § 167(j)(4) (1982) (restricting depreciation methods available for used property), with I.R.C. § 168 (1982) (no similar restrictions). Second, perhaps the interested parties
already act according to the reco=endation of this Note, see note 126 infra: they presume in
favor of depreciating the total investment (fair market value of asset plus premium) as a tangible asset.
109. Premium value could still exist as to other assets. For example, the lease may secure
market rentals for a lessor-constructed building and premium value for land.
110. See note 24-28 supra and accompanying text; note 94 supra and accompanying text.
111. The lease, of course, is for a fixed term. Because the purchaser has paid for the property subject to the lease, the lease seemingly meets the three requirements for depreciability.
See notes 17-28 supra and accompanying text.
112. Because there is no premium value, the rentals available under the lease are, by definition, no more valuable than rentals available in the market. See note 102 supra.
113. q: note 102supra and accompanying text (discussion of premium value as separate
from asset value).
114. See notes 56-57 supra and accompanying text; note 102 supra. The presence of a
depreciable interest, therefore, depends on the underlying asset. See note 62 supra and accompanying text (lease does not alter asset character). A lessor-constructed building is depreciable
under the rationale set forth in Part II. See notes 56-65 supra and accompanying text. An
interest in land is not depreciable. See Rubin, supra note I, at 1140; note 23 supra; see, e.g.,
Michaelis v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1175, I 179-80 (1970).
115. See notes 17-18 supra and accompanying text.
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attributable to an asset are below market rents. First, the lease is
certainly not depreciable. 117 The analysis that applies where the
lease secures market rents applies a fortiori where the lease is "unfavorable."118 In both cases, the lease has no separate value; 119 in fact,
the unfavorable lease is a detriment, as its name suggests. Thus, the
purchaser invests solely in the underlying asset. 120 Second, the unfavorable lease's sole effect on the underlying asset is to limit the
amount the purchaser will invest in that asset by limiting the asset's
income. 121 The fact that the asset might be appreciating in value as
the end of the lease draws nearer, 122 at which time the lease will no
longer constrain the asset's income producing potential, is of no tax
consequence. That appreciation will neither give rise to recognizable
income 123 nor affect the depreciability of depreciable 124 assets. 125
116. See, e.g., Michaelis v. Co=issioner, 54 T.C. at 1179; Quilliam, supra note I, at 27778.
117. See notes 109-116 supra and accompanying text.
I 18. Rubin, supra note I, at 1145.
I 19. See notes 112-113 supra and accompanying text.
120. See notes 114-115 supra and accompanying text.
121. By definition, the unfavorable lease secures below market rents. Expected rentals determine the amount that the purchaser will invest. See notes 56-57 supra and accompanying
text.
122. First, where the underlying asset is land and the lease is unfavorable, the land will
appreciate in value (unless market values decrease). See Rubin, supra note I, at 1145. Second,
a lessor-constructed building may appreciate in value, depending on how unfavorable the lease
is and how long the building will last after the lease terminates. Third, as an analogy, one
might consider that a lessee-constructed building, which generates no rents under the lease, see
note 66 supra and accompanying text, is also subject to an unfavorable lease. Where there is
likely to be a valuable reversion in that building, see notes 76-77 supra and accompanying text,
that reversion also appreciates. See Geneva Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.
764, 770-71 (1977), affd on other grounds, 622 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Goelet v.
United States, 161 F. Supp. 305, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
123. Generally, unrealized appreciation is not taxable although it is doubtful that realization is a constitutional requirement. See I B. BlITKER, supra note 14, ~ 5.2; M. CHlRELSTEIN,
supra note 12, ~ 5.01. Arguably, however, an exception should be made as to the "discount"
attributable to an unfavorable lease, particularly where land is the underlying asset. First,
unlike much of the unrealized appreciation that is untaxed, appreciation of an asset subject to
an unfavorable lease occurs not because of general market changes after the purchaser acquires the asset, but because of the running of the lease. Thus, the appreciation is more of a
certainty when the asset is purchased. Second, the policy favoring premium depreciation is
that it facilitates income and expense reporting. See note 103 supra. Income reporting would
also be facilitated by taking into account the increase in asset appreciation through annual
income recognition. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1232, 1232A (1982) (ratable inclusion in income and
reflection in basis of original issue discount on indebtedness).
Absent an explicit mandate from Congress, however, even these two arguments should not
justify an exception to the de facto realization requirement in the tax law. Treatment of bond
discounts and premiums under the Code illustrates congressional resistance. Although Congress has passed an exception for discounts on bonds, see I.R.C. §§ 1232, 1232A (1982), that
exception is limited to original issue discounts and does not apply to discounts that arise from
trading. In addition, Congress' rationale for the discount exception was not merely reporting
accuracy for a given taxpayer. Rather, Congress sought parallel treatment for the corporate
issuer of debt, who deducted interest annually, and the bondholder, who had previously not
recognized the interest income until disposition of the bond. S. REP. No. 552, 91st Congress,
1st Sess. 146, reprinted in 1966-1970 INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS 1639, 1791 (1971). See also H.

December 1983)
IV.

Note -

Purchaser's .Depreciation Rights

595

DIFFICULTIES IN VALUATING DEPRECIABLE INTERESTS

While the depreciable interests suggested in Parts II and III rest
on sound theoretical grounds, administrative infeasibility or
problems of proof arguably justify a court's refusal to recognize
some of those interests. In particular, the uniqueness of premium
and reversionary values raises valuation questions. However, the
difficulties posed by valuation are not sufficent to deny a purchaser
the chance to prove the value of these depreciable interests. 126
First, taxpayers will often be readily able to show the value of a
premium lease or a reversionary interest in a lessee-constructed
building. Where there is no lessor-constructed building and no reversion of significant value in a lessee-constructed building, 127 premium value can be determined as the excess 128 of the purchase
R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 109, reprinted in 1966-1970 INTERNAL REVENUE Acrs
l3 IO, 1394 (1971). Finally, although the Code explicitly allows amortization of bond premiums, see I.R.C. § 171 (1982); note 103 supra, the allowance is not limited to original issue
premiums but applies to market premiums as well. See l B. BITTKER, supra note 14, ~ 26.3, at
26-17. Thus, Congress has apparently not felt that amortization of premiums necessitates fully
consistent treatment of discounts.
124. The character of the underlying asset will determine depreciability. See note 114
supra.
125. Where a lessor-built building is depreciable during the lease term under the rationale
of Part II, see notes 56-65 supra and accompanying text, the fact that the value of that building
may be appreciating temporarily is ofno consequence to statutory depreciation of that building. See Fribourg Navigation Co. v. Commissioner, 383 U.S. 272, 277 (1966); Geneva Drive
In Theatre, Inc. v. Commissioner, 622 F.2d 995, 997 (9th Cir. 1980).
Further, an unfavorable lease as to one asset should not affect depreciability of other assets,
including premium value attributable to other assets. Rubin's approach would produce this
result if the unfavorable lease relates to land that features a lessor-constructed building.
Under that approach, the purchase price is allocated first to the land "based on its full unencumbered value at the time of acquisition," Rubin, supra note l, at 1149 (emphasis added),
regardless of below market rents attributable to the land. See id. at 1145-49. Rubin's treatment overvalues the land and thus reduces the portion of the total investment attributed to
depreciable assets. See note 74 supra (critique of Rubin's failure to recognize assets as separate). A reduction of the amount that can be depreciated effects an increase in the net rental
income that is taxable to the purchaser. Thus, Rubin's approach is equivalent to taxing unrealized appreciation of the land, an approach that has been shown to be improper. See note
123 supra and accompanying text.
126. Since this Note argues that part of an investment in a lessor-constructed building
subject to a lease may be attributable to an intangible asset, see note 108 supra and accompanying text, the IRS is the party likely to assert premium value as to a building. Where the
purchaser challenges the Service's assertion, the court should cautiously enforce the taxpayer's
burden of proof, see note 142-42 1i?fra and accompanying text, so as not to thwart Congress's
motive to encourage investment in tangible assets, see note 38 supra and accompanying text,
by making potential investors wary of "hidden intangibles."
127. A reversion in a lessee-constructed building may be of little or no value to the purchaser at the time of purchase in two instances. First, the lessee-constructed building may not
be expected to survive the lease term. Second, the lease term may terminate so far in the future
that the expected reversionary value, after discounting to the present, see Quilliam, supra note
l, at 283 (determining present value ofreversionary interest in building), may be insignificant.
128. See note 102 supra (reco=ended definition of premium value); Co=issioner v.
Moore, 207 F.2d 265, 277 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 942 (1954); see, e.g., Quilliam,
supra note I, at 261-62; cf. Cleveland Allerton Hotel v. Co=issioner, 166 F.2d 805, 807
("simple arithmetic").
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price 129 over the value of the land. 130 Similarly, if there are no lessor-constructed improvements and the lease does not appear to generate above-market rentals for the land, 131 the excess of the price 132
over land value 133 is presumably 134 allocable to the purchaser's reversionary interest in a lessee-constructed building. 135
Second, it is not clear that valuations required to determine premium and reversion values in more "complex" 136 situations will
present any new or insurmountable difficulties. Courts and the IRS
have long faced valuation and allocation questions. 137 Although
premium and reversion values may seem unique, they merely raise
129. Because the transaction between the purchaser and lessor is arm's length, the
purchase price should be a reliable indicator of the total value of the separate assets. See
Commissioner v. Moore, 207 F.2d 26S, 277 (9th Cir. 19S3), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 942 (19S4);
Rubin, supra note 1, at 11S3 n.58.
130. Because the land involved will generally be fungible business property, value appraisals should be both available and accurate. Moreover, reliance on such appraisals is not unco=on in tax cases. See notes 137-40 infra and accompanying text. See, e.g., World
Publishing v. Co=issioner Co., 299 F.2d 614, 617 (8th Cir. 1962) (relying on appraisals of
land value).
131. Where the land's value can be reliably appraised, see note 130 supra, market rents
should also be determinable. In addition, the court in Co=issioner v. Moore, 207 F.2d 26S
(9th Cir. 19S3), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 942 (19S4), suggested a comparison with other recent
leases. 207 F.2d at 276.
132. See note 129 supra.
133. See note 130supra.
134. Of course, the IRS or a court would have to ascertain that there is a lessee-constructed
building on the land, that its useful life could reasonably be expected to extend beyond the
lease term, and, that the purchaser could reasonably consider the reversionary interest currently valuable. Cf. note 127 supra (discussing how reversion could be ofno significant value);
note 77 supra and accompanying text (discussing determination of reversion's value).
13S. Cf. note 128 supra and accompanying text (similar calculation to determine basis in
premium value). Bui see Millinery Center Bldg. Corp. v. Co=issioner, 221 F.2d 322, 324 (2d
Cir. 1955) (court noting that where lessee purchased the fee interest from the lessor, "[w]e
doubt if a merely mechanical apportionment will adequately fix the intrinsic value of the
building reversion"), ajfd, 350 U.S. 4S6 (19S6).
136. Treas. Reg. § l.167(a)-S (1956) governs in a situation where a lump sum purchase
price must be allocated among various assets to determine their respective bases. As an extreme example of complexity, there could be five market values to deal with:
1) value of reversion in lessee-constructed building,see note 77 supra and accompanying
text;
2) value of lease premium attributable to lessor-constructed building, see note 108 supra
and accompanying text;
3) value of investment in lessor-constructed building not attributable to premium value,
see notes 62-64 supra and accompanying text;
4) value of lease premium attributable to land,see note 102supra and accompanying text;
and,
5) value of investment in land not attributable to premium value, see notes 102, I 14, &
120 supra and accompanying text.
The basis of a given component would be the amount that bears the same proportion to the
lump sum purchase price as the value of the component bears to the total value. See Treas,
Reg. § l.167(a)-5 (1956).
137. See, e.g., Millinery Center Bldg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 456 (1956); Commissioner v. Moore, 207 F.2d 26S, 275 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 942 (1954); Treas,
Reg. § l.167(a)-5 (1956) (valuing interests to allocate purchase price); Rubin, supra note. 1, at
1136.
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the same types of questions faced in the past. 138 Moreover, when
deciding valuation questions, courts have not required certainty; 139
they have noted: "We are quite aware that the result will be speculative, but ... some relief is [more just] than denial of all." 140 Thus,
proof of these depreciable interests is not impossible as a matter of
law.141
Third, the placement of the burden of proof in these cases is an
adequate safeguard where valuation is difficult. If the purchaser asserts a depreciable interest, he will bear the burden of proof. 142
Where the purchaser does not adequately 143 prove the value of the
depreciable interests he asserts, a court may deny relief on grounds
of insufficient proof. 144
CONCLUSION

The role of depreciation is to provide a means for a taxpayer to
recover his investment in wasting, income-producing assets. Thus,
where a taxpayer purchases property subject to a lease, the search for
interests depreciable during the lease term must focus on the wasting
assets that produce income under the lease. This Note identifies two
types of assets that are depreciable during the term: a lessor-constructed building and the premium value that a lease might command for a given asset. The Note also concludes that a purchaser can
depreciate his investment in a lessee-constructed building. However,
any investment in such a building cannot be depreciated before the
end of the lease. This result follows because the building produces
no income under the lease and because the purchaser has no investment in the building for that period.

138. Co=entators and the court in Commissioner v. Moore, 207 F.2d 265, 275 (9th Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 942 (1954), have suggested sound approaches to the valuation of
these interests. See generally Moore, 207 F.2d at 273-78; Quilliam, supra note l; Rubin, supra
note l; Co=ent, supra note 8. Further, the definition of premium value advocated by this
Note is flexible enough to accomodate readily available values. See note 102 supra.
139. See, e.g., Moore, 207 F.2d at 278; Rubin, supra note 1, at 1154.
140. Moore, 207 F.2d at 278 (quoting Bryant v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 103, 105 (2d Cir.
1935)); see also Co=ent, supra note 8, at 493.
141. See Moore, 207 F.2d at 277-78 & 277 n.16
142. E.g., Dobson v. United States, 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9693 (Ct. Cl. 1982); Commissioner v. Moore, 207 F.2d 265, 277-78 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 942 (1954);
Zi=erman v. Co=issioner, 67 T.C. 94, 104 (1976); 4 J. MERTENS, supra note 23, § 23.100.
143. The burden of proof should not, however, be too strict. See notes 139-40 supra and
accompanying text; notes 103 & 126 supra.
144. See, e.g., Midler Court Realty v. Commissioner, 521 F.2d 767, 770-71 (3d Cir. 1975).

